Global perceptions of US fall below Russia under Trump, survey finds: what the Democracy Perception Index shows

Headline finding in one sentence

An annual study commissioned by the Denmark-based Alliance of Democracies Foundation—the Democracy Perception Index (DPI)—reported that global net sentiment toward the United States has deteriorated for a second consecutive year and now sits below comparable net scores for Russia, according to Reuters reporting published May 8, 2026 and carried by outlets including Al-Monitor and U.S. News.

The same stories emphasize President Donald Trump’s foreign and economic policy choices as the interpretive frame offered by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the alliance founder and former NATO secretary general—a framing readers should label clearly as sponsor-adjacent commentary, not an independent academic verdict on causality.

The numbers wire services highlighted

Reuters, as summarized by Al-Monitor, says the DPI ranks country perception on a scale from −100% to +100%. In the 2026 release, net perception of the U.S. was −16%, described as a swing from +22% two years earlier. Russia was reported at −11% and China at +7%. The article adds that the United States was also frequently named when respondents were asked which country poses the greatest threat to the world, after Russia and Israel.

Those three bullets—U.S. −16, Russia −11, China +7—are the most-cited comparative anchors in English-language pickup. They do not, by themselves, mean that majorities in most countries prefer Moscow to Washington on every question; net scores aggregate positive minus negative balances and can hide sharp regional splits.

How and when the survey was fielded

According to the Reuters account, polling firm Nira Data conducted fieldwork between March 19 and April 21, 2026, drawing on more than 94,000 respondents across 98 countries. For the country perception module specifically, the story cites roughly 46,600 respondents in 85 countries.

Sample design details—online vs mixed-mode, weighting, language coverage, and non-response—matter enormously for cross-national rankings. The Reuters piece notes the survey did not spell out detailed criteria in the material reviewed by the wire, while the foundation describes its mission as advancing democratic values. Readers evaluating headline rankings should still download the full DPI tables when published and read the methodology appendix rather than relying on second-hand three-number summaries alone.

What Rasmussen said—and how to read it

Rasmussen is quoted calling the rapid decline in U.S. perception “saddening but not shocking” and tying it to transatlantic strain, broad tariffs, and threats framed around NATO territory—including Greenland rhetoric aimed at Denmark, a NATO ally.

Reuters also summarizes a cluster of policy references in the surrounding narrative: reduced U.S. aid to Ukraine, the U.S.–Israel military campaign against Iran and oil price effects, and April 2026 reporting that Trump said he considered withdrawing from NATO amid anger that European navies had not opened the Strait of Hormuz to global shipping after air war escalation. Those bullets are news-context links between polling release and recent events; they are not regression-proven drivers of each percentage point shift.

Why “US below Russia” is both striking and easy to over-interpret

On a pure PR level, Washington trailing Moscow on a net favorability index is a jarring headline for audiences trained on Cold War and post-1991 assumptions. Yet Russia remains deeply negative in absolute terms at −11% in this release’s global net figure—this is not an endorsement story so much as a relative collapse story for American soft power.

Comparative country images also interact with question wording: if items blend “contributes to democracy”, “threat to peace”, and “trust in leadership” dimensions differently by year, trends can move on instrument effects as well as real attitude change. That is why serious consumers of the DPI track year-to-year questionnaire stability and subnational tables.

China’s positive net score in the same table

Reuters notes the 2026 materials did not provide an immediate reason for positive sentiment toward China in the headline +7% net reading. That absence invites speculation—trade, South–South narratives, non-alignment, survey coverage—which responsible reporting should keep separate from stated foundation conclusions.

For policymakers, the practical point is simpler: Beijing and Washington are competing for narrative market share in third countries, and composite favorability is one input into host-government lean on 5G, bases, currency swaps, and UN votes—never the only input.

Timing: Copenhagen Democracy Summit

Wire coverage situates the report’s release ahead of the Copenhagen Democracy Summit on May 12, 2026. Conference scheduling does not change field dates, but it does shape media intensity: NGO reports dropped before high-level panels tend to drive shorter, headline-first pickup.

Expect speechwriters at the summit to either cite the DPI as evidence of democratic renewal urgency or critique it as Eurocentric framing, depending on speaker stake.

Most-cited factual anchors from current reporting

Scale anchor: perceptions reported on −100% to +100% net scale. Score anchor (global net): U.S. −16% vs +22% two years prior; Russia −11%; China +7%. Field window: March 19–April 21, 2026. Sample anchor: >94,000 respondents in 98 countries; ~46,600 in 85 for country perception module per Reuters. Threat ranking anchor: U.S. high on “greatest threat” mentions after Russia and Israel. Event anchor: Copenhagen Democracy Summit May 12, 2026.

Treat these as wire-reported summaries pending primary PDF verification by editors.

What responsible follow-up journalism looks like

Next-step reporting should map regional heat tables—how ASEAN, Latin America, EU, and Arab publics move independently—and compare leader-specific items (Trump vs institutional “America”). It should also interview non-sponsored pollsters about mode effects and social desirability bias on “threat” questions.

Finally, watch policy: if soft-power metrics fall while hard-power alliances hold, deterrence may persist even as student exchanges, visa denials, and media visas erode long-term trust.

Bottom line

The 2026 Democracy Perception Index, as described in Reuters coverage, records a steep negative shift in global net views of the United States—to −16%—placing Washington behind Russia (−11%) and far behind China (+7%) on that headline composite. The survey’s scale, timing, and sample are large, but interpretation requires methodological care and regional disaggregation.

For readers, the story is less “everyone loves Moscow” than “Washington’s brand premium in average global public opinion—at least in this instrument—has compressed to a point where traditional rivals look relatively less negative.” That is still a major strategic fact, even when headlines flatten it.