Trump's feuds, tensions with allies likely to outlast Iran war

Why allied friction may outlast the Iran crisis

Wars can end—or pause—with a communique, a ceasefire line, or a reopened shipping lane. Alliances, by contrast, run on habits of consultation, shared risk, and the belief that warnings in private will not become humiliation in public.

In May 2026, reporting around the U.S. conflict with Iran keeps drawing attention to missiles, oil, and maritime chokepoints. The story that may last longer is quieter: President Donald Trump’s approach to NATO partners and other close allies has fused several older grievances into a single, harder question—whether Washington still anchors the Atlantic security order it built after World War II.

What broke: surprise, Hormuz, and a credibility gap

According to NPR’s reporting, Trump’s decision to leave NATO without advance notice before launching strikes on Iran, followed by a push for alliance help as Washington sought ways to address the Strait of Hormuz, inflamed tensions that had already been simmering.

The piece quotes Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, saying “something fundamental has broken,” and it frames the core intellectual break in blunt terms: Trump, in that analysis, does not behave as if America’s security depends on Europe’s—an idea that collides with decades of U.S. grand strategy. Even when kinetic fighting eases, that kind of rupture does not snap back with the next news cycle.

Not only Iran: Greenland, Canada, and deeper doubt

The Iran episode did not arrive into a blank slate. The same NPR overview links the Middle East shock to a wider portfolio of frictions—among them Trump’s repeated focus on Greenland and Canada, and periodic suggestions that the United States could step away from NATO altogether.

Analysts cited in the reporting describe a loss of trust that tracks closely with Trump’s second term, including the sense among some allies that rhetoric about Greenland became serious enough that NATO itself was doing contingency planning that involved the U.S. as a hypothetical problem, not only as the alliance’s lead power. That is the sort of detail allies remember after the last bomb stops falling.

Germany, troop levels, and what withdrawals signal

Concrete military economics make the distrust operational. NPR reports that the Pentagon announced plans to withdraw about 5,000 U.S. service members from Germany—roughly 14% of the roughly 36,000 stationed there—after a public clash between Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz over Washington’s Iran strategy and whether Tehran had gained leverage in diplomacy.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth framed the drawdown as the outcome of a force-posture review, and a White House spokesperson told NPR that Trump had made disappointment with NATO “clear,” arguing Europe benefits from U.S. basing while sometimes denying access when Washington wants to defend “American interests.” Symbolic or not, withdrawals change planning horizons: they signal that protection is negotiable, not automatic.

Spain, the UK, and France: bases, distance, partial help

Base access fights are not abstract. NPR notes Spain refused U.S. use of two southern bases for operations connected to the Iran war, while British Prime Minister Keir Starmer publicly distanced the U.K. from America’s Iran policy—“This is not our war.”

London later pointed to minesweeping contributions aimed at keeping commerce moving through the strait without signing on to every U.S. tactic. France, per the same reporting, pre-positioned naval assets for a possible Hormuz-related mission. The pattern is familiar in coalition warfare: partial overlap, public hedging, and domestic audiences who hear their leaders saying “not fully with you.” That pattern outlasts any single week of strikes.

Capability gaps: why calm in the Gulf does not fix the ledger

European and Canadian forces have improved readiness and spending in recent years—NPR recounts how Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and long-running burden-sharing debates helped push many allies toward higher defense outlays—but experts cited in the piece still describe dependence on U.S. long-range strike, lift, intelligence, and nuclear extended deterrence.

Replicating those enablers could take years, creating a vulnerability window that Moscow could watch closely even while Washington and European capitals argue about Iran. Berlin’s new defense planning, also referenced in the reporting, reflects a Germany preparing to carry more weight; it does not erase the timeline problem.

Public opinion and politics on both shores

NPR cites polling and expert commentary about collapsing U.S. favorability in Germany and rising anti-American sentiment in Canada, where Prime Minister Mark Carney’s remarks about rebuilding order “out of Europe” land in a media environment shaped by tariff fights and sovereignty anxieties.

Allied leaders who stiffen their spines during a crisis may find it harder to walk back rhetoric after their publics have been told the United States treated them as optional partners. That dynamic is independent of whether Iranian radars go quiet.

NATO after the headlines: alliance without the old default

None of this requires predicting the legal end of NATO tomorrow. Congressional constraints on a unilateral U.S. withdrawal matter, and analysts in the NPR piece still expect an alliance of some kind to persist.

The more precise forecast is structural: the Iran war could shrink while the Trump-era feud with allies remains the baseline condition planners budget for. Ceasefires calm markets; they do not automatically restore confidential channels, predictable basing, or the old assumption that America will always pick up the phone before the first sortie.

What to watch next

Watch whether force posture changes are framed as reversible rotations or as durable divestment; whether European procurement accelerates in areas that reduce U.S. leverage; whether Middle East diplomacy holds without re-sparking the same access disputes; and whether NATO’s public messaging returns to shared threat pictures or keeps splitting into U.S. narratives and European caveats.

If those indicators stay negative while explosions near the Gulf fade, the story of May 2026 will not be “peace restored,” but “peace resumed—with a colder Atlantic.”

Bottom line

The Iran war may shrink faster than the Atlantic feud does. Allies are not only debating this president’s choices—they are revising assumptions about the next crisis and the U.S. role in it. That is why the tension has a longer half-life than the shooting war alone.